작성일 : 18-08-21 12:57
광복절을 맞으며..:F. Roosevelt's Conception on Korea's Independence
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이 글은 2000년에 들어 가면서 대학의 주요 보직을 끝내고 다시 연구에 몰두하기 위해 작성한 것이다. 이 글과 비슷한 한글 판은 1989년에 한국 정치학회 논집 ( 23집 1호 1989, pp. 125-146 )에서 발표하기도 했으나, 하와이 대학의 Hooper 교수의 도움으로 다시 작성하였다. 또한 2004년에 출간한 한반도 문제의 역사적 성격: 현대한국 외교사 ( 1920-2000 )- 한국 학술 정보 ( 주 ) 출간  (pp. 61-65) - 에도 일부 실려있다. 
당시 주요 관심은 “잊혀 졌던 한국문제” 가 언제 다시 거론되었으며, 그것은 어떤 내용이었는가 하는데 있었고, 따라서 카이로 회담 이전의 자료들을 중심으로 하였다.
이 글을 작성한 후 새로운 사실들이 나왔다고 주장하는 글들이 있었으나 ( 특히 중국 자료들 ), 그 당시를 주도하고 있었던 미국- 루즈벨트- 의 입장을 주 자료로 이용하였다. 따라서 미국의 FRUS, IPR 등 미국 자료를 중심으로 프랑스의 NED 자료를 참조하였다.
이 글을 다시 올려 보아야 하겠다는 생각은 남북대화를 추구하면서 생성되는 여러 문제들을 고려하면서, 한국의 독립 문제에 대한 이 당시의 미국의 기본적인 입장을 다시 한번 되돌아 볼 필요가 있다고 생각했고, 이것은 단지 한국인 뿐 아니라 미국인 들에게도 지금의 현실문제에 대한 시도에서 좋은 시사를 줄 것으로 판단했기 때문이었다. 
물론 카이로 이후에 냉전체제의 형성까지 그 영향력이 큰 국제정치적 변화가 수차에 걸쳐 일어났으나, 1942년-1947년 에 일어난 한반도와 관련된 각국 의 외교정책적 Nexus 를 명확하게 파악하는 것은 중요하며, 이것이 결국은 이후에 발생한 국제정치적 변화와 실제적 상호작용- 예를 들어 루즈벨트의 사망, 소련의 대일전 개입, Marshall 의 중국 파견, 냉전 체제의 형성, 그리고 한국 전쟁의 원인에 대한 국제관계적 맥락의 분석등 - 을 이해하는 데서 해결의 실마리를 얻을 수 있을 것이다.      
외교사 시간에 작고하신 박 봉식 교수님이 언급하시던, “ 한반도 문제의 논의에서 세력균형적 콘셉션을 벗어나야 한다” 는 말씀을 되새기면서 현실적인 한반도 문제의 논의가 활발해 지기를 기대해 본다.
동시에 미국의 동아시아  정책과 관련하여 한국의 국제정치가 과제로 하여야 될 것은 무엇인가를 생각해 보는 기회를 가져야 한다고 생각한다. 
미국은 1942년 부터 아-태 지역의 전후처리 문제를 검토하고 있었는데, Institute of Pacific Relations 가 중심이 되어 있었고 한국 문제와 관련하여 Rebel Korea ( Nym Wales ), Korea for the Koreans 등을 Pacific Affairs ( 정기간행물 ) 를 통해 발간하였다. Nym Wales  는 Edgar Snow 의 부인인 Helen Snow 의 筆名 으로 Song of Arirang 의 출간을 도와 주었던 사람이다.
IPR 은 전후처리 문제 검토의 일환으로 1942년 Canada의  Mont Tremblanc 에서 제8차 회의를 주관했고 여기서 처음으로 한국 독립의 문제가 거론되었다.

이 시대에 일본은 한국에 대한 제국주의적 지배 정당화를 위해 한국인의 자치능력의 결핍을 내세웠고, 스칼라피노와 이정식이 쓴 한국 공산주의 운동에 관한 글에서, 한국인의 민족적 특성의 하나로 분열성을 지적하고 있었다. 이 자치능력의 결핍과 분열성은 오늘날 한국정치에서 민주주의를 표방하면서 다양한 목소리를 대변한다고 하면서 국가적이기 보다는 지방적, 국민적이기 보다는 지역적, 파당적 정치 이익을 강조하는 양상을 나타내고 있는 것이 아닌지 숙고해 볼 필요가 있다.
상태가 좋지 못해 해독에 어려움이 있으리라고 생각되지만 한반도 문제 이해에 도움이 되기를 기대해 본다.


A Historical Reflection on the US's Policy of
Balance-of-power in East Asia 
F. Roosevelt's Conception on Korea's Independence
Young-shik Kim
(Professor, Sejong Univ.)

As Robert Oliver noted, Korea was a 'Forgotten Nation' during the period of 1920-1940 following her forced annexation by Japan in 1910(Korea: Forgotten Nation, 1944). During these years, however, there was a discussion in the U.S. Senate on the issue of restoring the Kingdom of the Korean nation. In a draft resolution concerning a reservation to the ratification of the Versaille Treaty, two Senators, Thomas and Shields, proposed on March 18, 1920, that the U.S. support the aspiration of the Korean people for liberation from Japanese tyranny and for the restoration of the Korean Kingdom and her membership in the League of Nationsl .
At the time, the primary concern of the U.S. was the expansion of the Japanese power in the Asian continent, especially the Japanese attempt to acquire Sandung peninsula and several Pacific islands in secret agreements during the Paris Conference.
After the Senate rejected the resolution, the New york Times ran an editorial, saying that the Korean question was only of a narrow significance, and should not interfere with the main trends of the world(March 20.1920). Seen from the point of balance of power, Japan was, for the U.S., a useful partner in containing the spread of Bolshevism in Asia and consequently Korea should remain under the rule of imperial Japan until it is strong enough to be autonomous.
Traditionally, the Korean Peninsula was considered, by the Chinese, part of the Chinese sphere of influence.
During the second half of 19th Century when the power struggle among the occidental Powers erupted in East Asia, Korea became an object of barter for the maintenance of the balance of power or status quo between the continental powers and the ocean powers. Due to its geopolitical location, the Korean Peninsula was the battle ground for the surrounding imperial powers vying for superiority, as shown in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894 and the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
With the passing of the Cold War, there has been renewed debate in the American government and academic circles concerning the revival of the traditional rivalry among the major powers - China, Russia and Japan - and the relaxation of tension on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of peace and security in East Asia.
In the debate, the strategic importance of the Korean Peninsula has been given greater attention within the context of the changing power relations in the surrounding region. A systematic American approach to this region, based on the concept of balance of power, should shed new light in that search.
Roosevelt Idea on Korean Peninsula was the first comprehensive and strategic approach to engage in East Asian region. Due to the insufficiency of physical forces and the self-negating attitude to play a positive role as a balancing power in this region, and also partly due to the complicated situations in China, that idea was to be revised in the final phase of the War. And consequently, American Government, in its search for a stopgap measure, had to take side with the one of the rivaling power surrounding Korean peninsula, and to be embroiled into the conflict in East Asia, as were well-shown in the events in 1950's and 1960's.
A retrospective on Roosevelt idea and the process of its revision thereafter could serve as a rule to evaluate and to understand the current American policy in this region.

l . Rooseveltian Initiative at Cairo
It was on February 22, 1942 through a radio speech that President Roosevelt made his first official statement concerning Korea's independence. lll The issue of the "Forgotten Nation" was raised again as a part of an overall American policy towards East Asia, to put a curb on the Japanese expansion.
Since Japan's forced annexation of Korea in 1910, the American government had maintained a policy of appeasement towards Japan, which was pursuing a policy of expansion on the Asian continent.
During a conference in Washington, held in 1921, the U.S. showed an interest in constraining Japan in her  penetration of China, by proclaiming a policy of keeping China's doors open. However, from another standpoint, the Japanese invasion in Manchuria was, for the American government, an opaque but tolerable situation. lV Though the American government, after the Japanese invasion of Manchuria, approached the Soviet Union and recognized the Soviet government, American policy in the Far East, after the conclusion of Sino-Soviet treaty of non-aggression in 1937, was flexible, to the point of consulting Japan on the secret stipulations in the Sino-Soviet treaty concerning Soviet provision of land lease and arms to China (NED, No. 196)  
The Cairo Declaration of 1943, the first official recognition of Korea's projected independence in an international agreement, was based on the idea that the post-War international order in East Asia should be grounded on a stable balance-of-power after the eradication of Japanese militarism. The implications  of the Declaration were enormous. At Cairo, Roosevelt, Churchill and Tchiang Kai-sek  decided on behalf of the Allied Powers to make Korea a free, independent nation "in due course"(FRUS, Cairo 1943, 399).
The phrase, it appears, contained connotations of both time and of procedure. It is reasonable to conclude, all the relevant facts considered, that Roosevelt took the initiative to include the stipulation in the joint Declaration. Though Tchiang Kai-sek also attended the talks on the Korean agendaV, it was Roosevelt who played the major role, taking into account the effects of American policy based on the balance of power on the independence of Korea and the relationships among the Allied powers during and after WWII. In consequence, the meaning of "in due course" should be understood in the context of Roosevelt's conception on the new world order in East Asia.
The discussion on the Post-war international order, particularly in East Asia, began in a concrete manner in Washington, in the talks between the British Foreign Minister Eden and Roosevelt. In the talks, held in March, 1943, Roosevelt referred to Korea and Indochina as Post-war trusteeship areas.
Roosevelt conceived of trusteeship as a way of dealing with the former colonies after the war(FRUS 1943.V01 11136-39).
At the same talks, Roosevelt presented the idea of making China a member of the executive council of the four major Powers, constituting an international organization, which would go on to make important decisions concerning the exercise of police powers with the objective of maintaining world peace. VI That idea was based on balance of power system in which China would be recognized as a power equal to Russia and, in this connection, independent Korea would be remain under the sphere of influence of China.Vli.
In the White House meeting to prepare for the Cairo talks, Roosevelt stated, during the discussions on the entrance of Russia into the Pacific War, that the Chinese would want equal rights with the Russians, and that Tchiang Kai-sek would desire a trusteeship of Korea under a committee formed by China, Russia and the U.S.(FRUS, 1943.China 1891).
In his consultation with Tchiang Kai-sek during the Cairo talks, Roosevelt set forth his views that China and the U.S. should reach an agreement concerning the future status of Korea. uIl What is certain is that in these talks the problem of Korea" independence was raised in connection with the trusteeship system after the War, and the concrete form of the trusteeship had to be worked out while the War was still being fought. Thus, it can be surmised that the meaning of "in due course" was intended to be ambivalent.
Another problem was how long the trusteeship should last. In the draft of the Cairo Declaration, prepared by the American government, the U.S. wanted Korea to be a free, independent nation "at the earliest possible moment"(FRUS, 1943 Cairo,399). The phrase 'in due course" was inserted at the insistence of Churchill who was worried about the future status of the British colonies in Asia(Stettinius Jr., 1949.)
Though the expression "at the earliest possible moment" was replaced by "in due course", the basic American conception of the post-War international order in East Asia and consequently the idea of Korea's independence was kept intact. IX 
Roosevelt's design to make China one of the major powers who would share the work of shaping the international order after the War continued until September of 1944. He thus hoped for a more active role for China in the war against Japan.
With this aim, he ordered in September 1943 Secretary of State Hull to assert in the conference of Foreign ministers of the major powers in Moscow the signing of a joint communique with the representative of China. X Throughout 1944, he dispatched Hurley, General Wedemeyer and General Stilwell to China to assist in the latter's political and economic reforms and war preparation against Japan.Xl
With the intention of promoting the American policy of consolidating the Chinese position after the War, Roosevelt proposed in his letter of July 1944 to Tchiang Kai-sek to appoint General Stilwell as the Commander-in-Chief of all military operations in China, including the Chinese communist forces and the American troops. Roosevelt pushed for acceptance of the proposal until August 1944. In September, he expressed in another letter to Tchiang his regret that Tchiang did not accept the proposal, and indicated that they might be faced with the catastrophic results of losing the key area of Eastern China.Xll
In Roosevelt's conception about Korea's independence, it can be pointed out that the Chinese role after the War was emphasized in connection with the balance of power in East Asia. Furthermore, thinking that the Soviet Union and China would be in competitive relations after the War in the configuration of power relations in East Asia, he preferred to make China more powerful by putting Korea in the Chinese sphere of influence and consequently by setting up a trusteeship of Korea until China could play a role as a major power.xiii
The phrase "at the earliest possible moment" included in the American draft of the Cairo Declaration is related to this conception about the duration term of the trusteeship in Korea. This conception, however, had to be modified due to the necessities of the War.

2. IPR and the Roosevelt Idea on Korea

American interest in the Korean problem reappeared immediately after the surprise attack by Japan of Pearl Harbor on December 8, 1941. The U.S. government had refused to receive the letter of the Korean Provisional Government, in which, since February 1941, the latter demanded recognition and Nevertheless, on December 22, 1941, 14 days after the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor, Secretary of State Hull sent to the American Ambassador in China, a directive to inform and to examine in detail the actual state of the Korean Provisional Government in Choungquing and the size and activities of its voluntary army.xiv
After exchanging views on Korean affairs, Hull gave instructions to Gauss, the American
Ambassador in China, to distinguish between the problem of independenceand that of recognition. XV
Finally, the U.S. government chose to support the future independence of Korea in the Cairo Declaration.
China also showed her interest in American policy with regard to the Far East since the outbreak of the Pacific War in December 1941. According to Dallek, Tchiang Kai-sek, in December 1941, asked in his letter to Owen Lattimore, a specialist in Far Eastern affairs, about the role of China in Asia after the War. In his response which was drafted after close consultation with President Roosevelt, Lattimore wrote about Roosevelt's trusteeship idea and of making China one of the four world policemen along with Russia, the U.S., and Great Britain. The fate of Korea, as a question of actual bases of which China and U.S. would preserve the peace of Western Pacific, is the one of the details that would be remained to be determined ultimately(Dallek, Roosevelt, 1979). Some months before the clarification of the official line of the American government, Quo Tai-chi, Foreign Minister of China, mentioned Korea's independence at a cabinet meeting, but Genralissimo Tchiang Kai-sek vetoed the recommendation of Quoand advised its delay. XVl It is difficult to tell exactly from whom, under what process and influences Roosevelt received the idea concerning the independence of Korea. It is, however, possible to trace back, up to a certain point, through the analysis of the internal affairs of the U.S. in those days.
At that time, the Institute of Pacific Relations IPR was the sole research institute for Pacific-Asian affairs in the U.S. This institute was established in 1925 under the sponsorship of the Carnegie and the Rockefeller Foundations with the intention of providing a forum to discuss the actual problems of this region from all standpoints.xvii
In 1942, IPR began to publish papers and books about Korea, for example, Grazanzev's articles about Korean political and economic affairs. In addition, IPR began to work on Korean affairs. Its research periodical, "Pacific Affairs" and Nym Wales' article on "Rebel Korea" are good examples of its efforts.xviii
What is most important is that IPR dealt with the theme "Future Status of Asian Colonial Territories" at its 8th conference held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, Canada in December 1942.XlX In this conference, there was a serious discussion on Korean affairs. W. Johnstone reported on the substance of the discussion as follows: "Almost all the papers were reaching agreement that Manchuria should be put again under the rule of China and that Korea should be liberated from Japanese domination. These reporters are reflecting the general views that independence of Korea is a problem which can decide the future development of that situation. However, most reporters seem to feel, while discussing this problem, that some kind of international support and direction would be necessary before the realization of complete independence. At the same time, there was agreement that, in any case, international assistance for its economy and finance should be provided for Koreans. 
Comparing the substance of the discussion in IPR with the editorial of the New York Times of
March 20, 1920, it can be confirmed that there was a big progress in the momentum for recognition of Korea's independence on the one hand. But on the other hand, there was no change in the American members' doubt concerning the capacity of Korea for self-rule.
Before the opening of the Cairo talks in 1943, IPR published a amphlet titled "Korea for Koreans", in which the recognition of the Korean provisional government in China and the necessity of independence of Korea were reemphasized, while evaluating highly Koreans' efforts to stand against the common enemy, Japan and to acquire freedom(Korea for the Koreans, 1943).It would be interesting to follow the process of how these and views of IPR discussion were transmitted and influenced the decision-making of President Roosevelt with regard to Korean affairs.
O. Lattimore, who was at that time the core executive member of IPR, was working, since
February 1942 after returning from China where he had worked as an adviser to Tchiang Kai-sek in 1941, with Lauchlin Currie, who was Special Councilor on Far Eastern affairs and Executive Assistant to President Roosevelt Post-War planning began in the State Department in 1942, and IPR organized a group, according to the proposition of Ray Veatch, who was also a member of IPR, to start the discussion on the Post-War project .
It was Lauchlin Currie who organized the 8th conference of IPR at Mont Tremblant in December 1942, and the publications of IPR concerning the Far East were the sole publications that reached the State Department by Dr. Edna Flugel, who was Councilor of Post-War Planning of the State Department .
At that conference, Maxwell Hamilton, Chief of the Far East Division of the State Department,
Stanley Hornbeck, Advisor to the State Department, and Leo Pasvolsky, Special Assistant of the Secretary of State participated.xxi
Judging from the fact that the trusteeship idea was conceived by the U.S. to replace the colonial system in the new international order, and that the U.S. policy was to make China a world power to replace Japan in Asia, the decision of the Allied powers concerning the independence of Korea could not but be discussed within the framework of the American conception of new international order in the Far East .
At the conference in Teheran, which was held immediately after the Cairo Conference, Stalin 
approved the Cairo Declaration, saying that justice called for Korea to be independent(FRUS, 1943 Cairo p.565). But the initial idea of Roosevelt on the Post-War international order in East Asia and consequently on Korea's independence had to be modified due to Chinese inaction concerning the war against Japan.

3. American Policy towards the Far East before Yalta

Which one country of the two future rivals in Asia, China and Soviet Russia, would take part in the war against Japan was a critical question not only in its impacts on establishing Post-war power relations in East Asia, but also in its influences on the independence of Korea.
It is important to note that the U.S. had considered and suggested the desirability of Soviet participation in the war against Japan since December 1941, at the same time with that of China.xxii After the official notification, however, by the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, Litvinov, on December I l , 1941, that the Soviet Union could not afford to cooperate with the U.S. against Japan, President Roosevelt suggested to Tchang Kai-sek to take the initiative in the Allied efforts to destroy Japan.xxiii
It was at the talks of Chiefs-of-Staffs of the U.S. and Great Britain in Washington from December 1941 to January 1942, that it was decided to support the Chinese efforts in the war against Japan.
U.S. had made efforts to make China a world power with aid, beginning in 1938 and increasing to 120 millions dollars, and also beginning in since March 1942, through the negotiations with China on the abrogation of the special rights of the U.S. in China, and lastly through the American guarantee of admission of China as a signatory to the declaration of four powers, signed in Moscow on September 24, 1943(FRUS, 1939.V01 11p.418) .
The question of the participation of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan had been raised intermittently in Washington in the substance of an American proposition of the exchange of military information concerning the Far East, but the Soviets had not responded positively.xxiv
With the amelioration of the military situation on the European front, and also due to the Japanese  occupation of the Alioutien islands in June 1942, American-Soviet talks was held, at last, in Moscow. However, American-Soviet relations remained in a standstill until the conference of the foreign ministers in October 1943.
At the conference in Moscow, Stalin declared to C. Hull, the U.S. Secretary of State, that when the Allies are successful in defeating Germany, the Soviet Union would join in the war against Japan When the question of the participation of China and the Soviet Union in the war of the Far East was raised in a meeting at the White House for the deliberation of the agenda for the Cairo conference, Roosevelt supported the position of China, and that was reflected in the Cairo Declaration."V
Stalin, at the conference in Teheran, held immediately after the Cairo conference, approved the Cairo Declaration, declaring that the Chinese should fight. Stalin gave his words to Roosevelt that the Soviet Union would participate in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany. Stalin declared that, for the offensive operation the Soviet military forces in the Far East should be reinforced three-fold."VI This position of the U.S., or rather of the State Department, with regard to China was maintained until May 1944, that is, until the Normandy Landing.
Until that time, according to a memorandum prepared by the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East of Defense Department, based on the general plan concerning the trusteeship of Korea, not only American military operations in Korea, but also the occupation of considerable portion of Korea by Soviet troops were suggested.xxvii But at the same time, the committee decided that the U.S. should not be the only trustee in Korea.
Upon planning for the defeat of Japan, begun from Spring of 1944, the Supreme Command of the U.S. Army accepted the necessity of the invasion of the main islands of Japan, and suggested the desirability of Soviet action in Manchuria to facilitate the American invasion of Kyushu and the heart of Japan It must be noted that, in the plan of the Supreme Command of the U.S. Army in April 1944, the Soviet participation in the military operations in the Far East was not included.
Since February 1944, Stalin had repeatedly proposed military cooperation with the U.S. In September, he asked Harriman, the American Ambassador to Moscow, if the U.S. wished to bring the Japan on her knees without the Soviet assistance, or if the U.S. would desire, as he suggested in Teheran, the participation of the Soviet Union. Stalin questioned the Ambassador on the role of the Soviet Union in the Pacific war.xxvlli
On the other hand, at the time, Sino-American relations were strained. Tchiang Kai-sek, who, since 1939, was intent on making the Chinese communists illegal, contrary to the expectations of the U.S., informed Roosevelt in March 1944: "The rest of my task is to maintain the present fronts until the time when the ground and naval forces of the Allies could be dispatched. "(G. Kolko, 1968)
Finally, in September 1944, President Roosevelt wrote in his letter to Chiang: " I had pushed, several times in these months, to this that you would take an energetic action to resist against the catastrophe which had approached to China and to you. And now, as you had not yet designated General Stilwell at the head of Total forces in China, we are faced with the loss of the crucial zone of East of China, with the possible catastrophic consequences. "(US Relations with China, p.66-67.)
The State Department, before the Yalta conference, eliminating the President's idea for China weighed against the necessities of war, recommended to the President that "this Government------would not assure the support to the policy of Chinese Government, which could interrupt the military action of the Soviet Union against Japan. "(FRUS, 1945, Yalta p.352).
In September 1944, Roosevelt gave his approval to the project for the defeat of Japan,submitted by the Supreme Command of Army, and in which American forces were planned to attack Kyushu on October l, 1945 and Tokyo in December 1945, 18 months being judged necessary to end the war against Japan.XXIX
The Supreme Command of the Army enunciated on September 28, 1944 the strategic concepts of Soviet participation in the war against Japan, according to which the task of the Soviet forces should be the interdiction of communication lines between Japan proper and the Asian continent through the Korean Peninsula, and the destruction of the ground and naval forces of Japan in Manchuria.
The strategic change in the Sino-American-Sovietic tripartite relations could not but have
repercussions on the Korean problem. The non-enthusiastic attitude of the Chinese in the face of the problem of Korea's independence was well expressed on April 17, 1943 at the talks between Assistant Secretary of State and the Ambassador of China in Washington, in which Soong declared that the Chinese were in favor of letting that subject be put on hold for the moment."X
The trusteeship of Korea was discussed at the conference of Yalta between Roosevelt and Stalin, but under a totally different angle from that of Cairo.

4. Yalta Conference and Korea

At the conference of Yalta, President Roosevelt imputed to the government of Tchiang Kai-sek the responsibility of the failure in the coalition of Kuomintang and the Chinese communists, and Stalin declared that the Chinese were in need of a new leadership around Tchiang Kai-sek.xxxi
After the Soviet Union revealed on October 15 1944 the plan to attack Japan two or three months after the defeat of Germany, President Roosevelt gave, on December 15, to Harriman in Moscow a directive to consult Stalin on the political conditions of Soviet engaging in the war against Japan(FRUS, 1945 Yalta, p.379).
In this connection, Stalin declared that the Kurile Islands and the Southern part of Sakhalin should be restituted to Russia and drawing a line from Vladivostok to the periphery of Liaotung Peninsula, demanded the lease of that region, including the Port of Dairen and Port-Arthur(FRUS, 1945. Yalta, p.379).
Though there were reports from the American representatives in Moscow for reexamination of American policy towards the Soviet Union in December, the conclusion of the Supreme Command of Army, made on November 23, 1944 and adopted at the conference of Yalta, expressed delicately the necessity of Soviet participation in the Pacific war as follows: "Soviet participation, as much as desirable, is not essential, but national interest of the Soviet Union will push her inevitably into the war of Pacific, and the moment of that operation will be influenced by the military and logistic supports of U. S. To provide the maximum support to our principal efforts, Russian offensives in Manchuria and air-attack against Japan must be launched at least three months before our invasion of Kyushu in November 1945."(Entry of Soviet Union, 38-41)
The Commander-in-Chief of the Army concluded: "We desire the participation of the Soviet Union in the War at the nearest date compatible with her capacity to engage herself in the offensive operation, and we are ready to offer the possible maximum support." The discussion at the Yalta conference between Roosevelt and Stalin concerning the Pacific war was restricted to a confirmation on the part of the Soviet Union of her entrance into the war against Japan two or three months after the end of the European war, and that of the political conditions by U.S. for the Soviet participation.
In the treaty signed at Yalta, the three Great Powers agreed, in the second article, that "the former rights of Russia, violated by the attack from Japan in 1904, will be restituted."xxxii
It is important to note that the Russian rights violated in 1904 by Japan had been stipulated in the treaty of Portsmouth, concluded in 1905, after the Russo-Japanese War. In that treaty, Russia surrendered the lease of Port-Arthur, Dairen, the Manchurian railroad, the southern part of Sakhalin, and fishing rights in the Sea of Okhotsk and of Behring. 
The second article also stated: "The Imperial Government of Russia, recognizing that Japan possess in Korea the predominant political and economic interests, commit herself not to intervene, nor to put an obstacle to the measures of direction, of protection and the control that the Imperial Government of Japan can consider necessary to take in Korea."(Britsh Documents, p. 108) If so, one can not suggest that Stalin had forgotten that Russia had lost, after all, her interests in Korea, when he demanded at the Yalta conference the restitution of Russian rights violated in 1904.
However, in the Yalta Treaty, there wasn't any mention about Korea. Simply, on the occasion of the Stalin-Roosevelt talks on February 8, 1945, at Roosevelt's insistence, the two leaders discussed the problem of the trusteeship of Korea.xxxiil
In the talks, Roosevelt said that he thought Koreans would need 20 or 30 years to be prepared for autonomy. Stalin responded that a shorter period would be preferable, and he inquired Roosevelt if any foreign troops would be stationed in Korea. President Roosevelt responded in the negative, and Stalin expressed his approval.xxxiv
The American-Soviet discussion on the collaboration in the military operations of Pacific war began on October 17, 1944, when Stalin made clear his intention to go to war against Japan(Entry of Soviet Union, p.37). What remained yet for Soviet participation against Japan was to acquire from China the special rights in Manchuria, to declare war against Japan, and to discuss with the U.S. on the delimitation of military operation zone in the Far East.
As for the Soviet special rights in Manchuria, the Sino-Soviet negotiation began on July l , 1945 in Moscow. At the Yalta conference, Stalin had asked Roosevelt to keep secret the political conditions for Soviet participation in the war against Japan and to notify to Tchiang Kai-sek after the displacement of the Soviet Army from Europe to the frontier of the Russo-Japanese war in Manchuria.xxxv
Even in this changeable and flexible situation in the Far East, caused by the change of its partner in the pursuit of war against Japan, it seems that the basic Rooseveltian idea of making China one of the great powers in Asia, containing Bolshevism and replacing Japanese dominant position after the War, was maintained, and the idea was further made a long-term objective.xxxvi That could be proved by the fact that Roosevelt had mentioned in Yalta, the trusteeship of Korea extending over 20 or 30 years, instead of "at the earliest possible moment" as stated in Cairo, and the necessity of collaboration between Kuomintang and Chinese Communists. That is why Roosevelt had tried, before his death on 12 April 1945, to reexamine the comprehensive war plan against Japan, concluded at Yalta, and to criticize the Soviet occupation policy of Eastern Europe . 
After the President's death, the situation in the Far East was primarily dealt with by the Department of War, represented by General Marshall, who, after reexamining the question of the Soviet participation in the Pacific war under the military aspects and emphasizing the minimization of the loss of American lives in the operation, eliminated the necessity of landing American forces in Korea. He concluded with resignation that the cost of assuring a position of value in Korea would almost certainly be greater than that of the operation in Kyushu and the operation in Korea could be combined with the landing from the East Sea and the invasion by ground forces from Siberia solely by the Russians .
The so-called American policy of "Do Nothing", or "Until the Dust Settles", which was expressed by Acheson in the Senate hearings in 195 1 (Military Situation 195 1 .), indicated the tangled situation in China, caused by the internal struggle between the Kuomintang and the communists. The irresoluteness of  the American government in its dealing with the Korean question after 1945 could be understood in this connection. 

Conclusion

The American government became one of the concerned parties to the problems of East Asia with the hosting a conference in Washington Conference in 1921 with the proclamation of an "open door policy in China" and taking upon the responsibility for the balance of power in this area, replacing the role of Great Britain in Asia. American interest in Korea had been marginal and opportunistic, in economic as well as political sense, during the first half of 20th century as shown in the discussion in the Senate in 1920.
Seen from the viewpoint of balance of power, especially during the period of imperialism, annexation could be a convenient means of balancing powers by way of territorial compensation. The domination of Japanese militarism over Korea was tolerable for American policy, which focused on containing Bolshevism and maintaining the balance of power in this region.
It might not be, however, simple irony that the same logic of balance of power was applied to secure the independence of Korea in the last phase of WWII. Though it is understandable that the changed American attitude was due to the changed international political situation brought on by the common struggle against the totalitarianism, there still remained the legacy of Japanese militarism which propagated, at the time of its forced annexation of Korea, the lack of Korean's capability of self-rule as its pretext of forced annexation.
The idea of trusteeship was in fact another version of the balance of power approach to the new international order after WWII, a convenient tool for establishing a sphere of influence and balancing the relations among the powers.
Nominally, the independence of Korea was recognized by the Allies since the Cairo conference, but the doubt of the Allies about Korea's capacity for autonomy had to be linked to the trusteeship as a natural consequence.
The difference between Roosevelt and Stalin on the duration of the trusteeship of Korea is
connected with their judgements concerning the development of war situation in the Far East. Stalin had sufficient information on the reality of China, for example the relations between Kuomintang and the Chinese communists, and a resolute will with regard to the post-War status of the Soviet Union in East Asia, backed by sufficient military forces. On the other hand, Roosevelt had very limited information on the actual state of China, as revealed in his reference of the Chinese communists as 'margarine' communists or 'agrarian' revolutionaries,xxxvii and could not have a clear view on the development of war situation due to the intricate situation in China and also to the insufficiency of American military manpower. It seems that Roosevelt had believed the possibility of reviving his idea on the post-War power relations after the defeat of Japan. This can be inferred from his reference on the trusteeship of Korea in a long-term perspective.
It is notable, however, that Stalin, in his talks with Hopkins in May 1945, held immediately after the death of President Roosevelt, presented a new demand, which was not included in the political conditions for Soviet participation in the Pacific War, to hold talks concerning the Soviet part in the eventual occupation of Japan and agreement between the Allies on the occupation zone before the collapse of Japan.xxxviii It is a well known fact that these Soviet demands worked as one of the factors that contributed to American-Soviet Cold War, and consequently to the division of Korean Peninsula between the US and the USSR.xxxix. It can be very suggestive to consider the fact that China has always regarded the Korean Peninsula as a hedge for her security, and that the third power who wanted to restrain China has always focused in on Korea, which offered the shortest inland road to Beijing and consequently the quickest way to threaten the security of China.

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