* 이글은 IACSS-17 로 지난 12월 19 일, 광운대 한종휘 교수와 함께 발표한 논문입니다.
올리기는 헸지만 너무 길어서 읽기가 불편할 것 같습니다..( International Journal of Emerging Trends in Social Sciences, ISSN 2521-3539, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2018, pp. 41-51 )

간략하자면,
소련이 붕괴한 이후 전 소련에 속했던 지역에 있는 핵무기및 물자를 처리하기위해 미국이 Nunn-Lugar 상원의원들의 발의로 러시아와 해당 구연방소속 나라, 미국이 Umbrella Agreement 를 체결하고, 핵무기와 미사일의 분리 등 핵무기의 폐기, 그리고 플류토늄, 우라늄 등 핵 물질의 집중, 공동 관리를 통해 핵 위협의 축소를 성공적으로 실현시킨 Cooperative Threat Reduction ( CTR ) 을  북핵에도 적용해 보고자 하는  의도에서 이 글을 작성하였습니다.

Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund
Year        Government fund        Non-government fund        Deposit received
        Operating profit        Total accumulated
(KOR WON)        Total accumulated
(US dollar)*
Total        4,893,803        2,723        7,001,274        958,306        12,856,106        10713.42
2016        92,500        1        207,000        27,399        326,900        272.41
2015        93,203        238        90,500        19,863        203,804        169.84
2014        93,400        -        228,600        47,304        369,304        307.75
2013        105,500        3        530,000        162,300        797,803        664.84
2012        112,800        2        400,000        51,236        564,038        470.03
2011        -        2        104,400        38,276        142,678        118.9
2010        -        -        875,000        51,238        926,238        771.87
2009        -        56        81,000        74,354        155,410        129.51
2008        650,000        52        147,500        49,274        846,826        705.69
2007        500,000        75        584,591        38,859        1,123,525        936.27
2006        650,000        15        940,000        36,619        1,626,634        1355.53
2005        500,000        33        460,000        31,178        991,211        826.01
2004        171,400        1        310,000        38,372        519,773        433.14
2003        300,000        1        823,000        46,515        1,169,516        974.6
2002        490,000        77        505,000        42,035        1,037,112        864.26
2001        500,000        1,079        310,000        29,406        840,485        700.4
2000        100,000        542        254,852        30,393        385,787        321.49
1999        -        3        149,831        23,013        172,847        144.04
1998        -        -        -        40,280        40,280        33.57
1997        50,000        288        -        27,874        78,162        65.14
1996        100,000        132        -        18,409        118,541        98.78
1995        240,000        119        -        14,589        254,708        212.26
1994        40,000        1        -        9,387        49,388        41.16
1993        40,000        3        -        4,778        44,781        37.32
1992        40,000        -        -        5,118        45,118        37.6
1991        25,000        -        -        237        25,237        21.03
(unit: million won)
Source: ROK Ministry of Unification, “Inter-Korean Cooperation Fund” (December 2016)
*added by authors: $1 adjusted to 1200 won

By the way, one can find an interesting difference between the amounts of government fund raising under the progressive regimes of the Kim and Noh administrations from 2000 to 2008; an average amount per year is 450,000 million Won, about $375 million, but under the conservative one, especially under the Park regime, the average amount of government-raised funds per year was 96,200 million Won, around $80.1 million, less than half of the amount for those progressive regimes
Consider the case of Ukraine, which was left with an estimated 176 ICBMs and 14 nuclear reactors. The George H. W. Bush administration’s pledge of $175 million was more than the real costs. Potter maintains that the ROK can be fully charged with the cost of the CTR program in North Korea (Potter, 1995: 8-9). The accumulated funds of ROK’s own would make Potter’s claim more feasible and valid in implementing the CTR program for North Korea. Taking the yearly funding of the US Congress into account, where the lowest funding was $300 million in FY 1996, and the highest was $528.5 million in FY 2014, the annual funding by South Korea of $300 million would be enough for the North Korean CTR (Walker, 2016). On top of that, according to Goldman and O’Kelly, the costs of LUE conversion and the spent fuel return are presumed to be between $7.5 and $12 million, taking 2-3 years (Goldman and O’kelly, 2005). Even the 5-megawatt Yongbyun reactor, which would cost billions of dollars, could be burdened with the collected civilian funding in South Korea. Kang, a nuclear scientist, has argued that the South Korean government expressed interest in the idea of the CTR program, and trained North Koreans during the KEDO projects to build the two LWSs. In 2002, the Korean Electric Power Company conducted a 13-week long training for 125 North Korean engineers (Kang, 2009). Again, recalling the previous experience of the South, in order to resolve the North Korean nuclear problems, it would be crucial for the South Korean government to already have economic resources as well as some technical capability in cooperation with the US to participate actively in the CTR programs for North Korea.
Though Sam Nunn who was a former Senator, Democrat and Richard Lugar who was a former Senator, Republican differed in their political party affiliations, they worked together as Senators, to realize the denuclearization or dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Russia and former Soviet Union territories, as mentioned above. They forged partnership in their efforts to non-proliferate, dismantle or destroy the nuclear weapons, to safeguard the nuclear materials in the US Senate. After their retirement from Senate, Lugar in 2007, Nunn in 1996, Lugar worked in the Lugar Center, a non-profit organization focusing on the nuclear non-proliferation problem and Nunn, beginning from 2001, organized Nuclear Threat Initiative ( NTI ), which was a non partisan, non profit organization, with the help of Ted Turner to deal with the problem of weapons of mass destruction.
Lugar took part in the USKI (United States-Korea Institute, School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University) held conference under the title of “Policy Prescriptions for the North Korea Threats” in June 2017, and Nunn presented with Mike Mullen, his task force report to Council on Foreign Relations (CFR ), titled  “A Sharper Choice on North Korea” in September 2016. Lugar take emphasis on the application of experiences and lessons learned from the case of dismantlement of nuclear weapons in the former Soviet Union territories to North Korean case, and Nunn, with his experiences in NTI, like Nuclear Security Projects and Nuclear Security Index, engaged in model programs to shape and implement to reduce the threats, and inspire privates and governments efforts to secure and manage the nuclear materials (Crowley, 2007).  Particularly, Sam Nunn has presented his views on North Korean Nuclear issue several times since January 2017, starting from the statement for the record on U.S. Policy toward North Korea to the U.S. Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee on Jan. 31, 2017. In this presentation, he indicated the growing capability of DPRK to strike U.S. with nuclear weapons, and the grave proliferation danger. He pointed out the key role of China in addressing this danger, which was negated by Trump himself in June (Lander and Harris, 2017).
And in his interview with Wolf Blitzer of CNN on 24th of April, 2017, Nunn opined that US did not seem to have a strategy, though he acknowledged that the President is putting emphasis on the diplomatic option and on the UN. Nunn, in his interview on 25th of April, he, putting the freeze of weapons and test of missiles on the part of North Korea as a goal, said US should have an informal bilateral talks with North Korea. He preferred to use “dialogue” instead of “negotiation”, and direct talks and informal talks without preconditions  before going to negotiations. He proposed a multi-level talks, including talks between officials, and between military officials. In his presentation in the Senate in January, 2017, he made some recommendations to be included and implemented in parallel: first offer genuine incentives for North Korea to take part in substantive talks or negotiations, like peace agreement to end Korean war and the normalization of relations and to increase pressure or sanction on North Korea. He eventually suggested to strong sanctions like suspension of North Korea’s credentials at the UN, and against military attacks of North Korea or refusal to negotiate, he suggested an active proportionate self-defense response, including inside North Korea.
III.        US-ROK Summit Talks and After
In June 30, the two Presidents of U. S. and Republic of Korea, reaffirmed in Washington D.C., the mutual trust and shared value as allies, and also reaffirmed the their commitment to counter the growing threat to peace and security posed by North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. And they pledged to continue closely to achieve the shared goal of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner. They reaffirmed the two sides’ shared top priority to resolve the nuclear issue and they do not maintain a hostile policy toward North Korea and together, stand ready to offer a bright future for North Korea if it chooses the right path. And the two leaders emphasized that the door to dialogue with North Korea remains open under the right circumstances, and President Trump supported the ROK’s leading role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula (Yonhap News Agency, June 1, 2017).
It is generally acknowledged that President Moon had a good result in his diplomacy with the U.S. by his first visit to Washington, except the burden-sharing problem and trade. But it is to be reminded that there remains lots of obstacles to overcome in the relations with North Korea. First, North Korea adamantly reiterated their insistence that the nuclear issue is the matter of concern between U.S. and North Korea (Yonhap News Agency, June 29, 2017) . According to Yonhap news, Nodong shinmun ran an article saying that South Korea has no cause to interfere and that the issue did not have any relations with the South-North relations.
Second, though South Korea obtained a support from the U.S. in playing a leading role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification, that unification could not but depend on the resolution of nuclear issue.  At most, the possible means of fostering the relaxation of tensions, and if possible the confidence building measures which support the stability and security of the peninsula, could be discussed between the two Koreas.
It’s imperative, first of all, to have a dialogue, and to make a progress in the relations between the two. It is to have a plan, or roadmap, not strategy, if one takes into account the four principles which were declared in the special address of President Moon on June 3o in CSIS. The four principles in the policy for North Korea are, first, No antagonistic policy to DPRK, second, No military attack to North Korea, third, No Regime change or collapse of North Korea, and fourth, No intentional acceleration in the process of unification of Korea (Seoul Daily, July 6, 2017).
And President Moon, during his participation in G-20 Conference held in Germany, on July 6, 2017 made a declaration in his address that he would pursue a peace treaty to end a war with North Korea, taking a step forward for reconciliation and he would take a comprehensive approach to North Korea’s nuclear issues. He reconfirmed President Trump’s reassurance and support in his intention to have a dialogue and inter-Korean exchanges with North Korea, though under certain condition (Korea Times, July 6, 2017). While he mentioned human rights records of United Nations about North Korea, he also took emphasis on humanitarian aid for civilians. Though the CTR approach to Korean peninsula’s denuclearization problem does not raise a serious problem in its development of technical process of denuclearization, the essential question for this approach is how to lead North Korea to its bargaining table. It is generally understood among concerned parties that all the sanctions including UN are to lead North Korea to the diplomatic table. After his inauguration of supreme leader in North Korea, Kim Jung-un made a dozen missile tests in 2017 only and three nuclear tests since December 2011.
After his July 4th missile test, he expressed it as his present to America on the Independence Day. But as irony would have it, it was the 45th anniversary of the 7.4 South-North Joint communique, which proclaimed the independent and peaceful unification of Korea in national unity. It raised the debate on the nature of the missile among Russians who insisted that that was not ICBM as proclaimed by Americans. Russians were insisted that the missile was not ICBM but Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM). The difference in their conceptions surrounding the deterrence resulted in their evaluation of the nature of that missile. From the claimers of Russian deterrence, the purpose of North Korea’s missile test was to assure their capability of targeting US bases and Allies in the North East Asia, not targeting US mainland. According to a media report, the 6th test of nuclear bomb is on the list. NYT reported, citing a report issued by 38 North, a research Institute of John’s Hopkins University, Joseph Bermudez said “The rugged test site appeared able to conduct a sixth nuclear test, at any time upon receiving order” (Broad, 2017). After the launching of ICBM or IRBM on July 4, lots of American scholars have expressed a pessimistic view, like Sue Mi Terry, a former CIA analyst (NPR, June 28, 2017) and some of the hawkish consultants like Michael Auslin, a Williams-Griffith Fellow, take a very negative attitude toward North Korea (Auslin, 2017).
Besides the recent worsening situation for solving the North Korean nuclear issue, another obstacle was to be overcome is what Michael Krepon pointed out in his book, “Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future” (Krepon, 2003). Krepon, while analyzing the policy transitions from Mutual Assured Destruction to CTR in strategic arms control, placed Cooperative Threat Reduction in his third transition period after the second transition period in which Reagan Administration put emphasis on strategic arms reduction. Through the three transition period, according to Krepon, there was a persistent debate among scholars and government officials about the military policy surrounding strategic arms control (2003: 249-250). “Dominators”, a prevailing group formed by government officials and republican party’s inclination, insisted US’s nuclear superiority putting emphasis on the military activities, missile defense, based on the non-proliferation, for example, like a “National Posture Review released in 2002 in Bush Administration (2003: 106-113). On the other hand, “Conciliators “ under the review from future perspective, dis-equilibrium should be changed, putting emphasis on treaties, cooperation among states, and diplomacy with persuasion based on trust among states, forming a coalition and partenership (2003: 253).
After Presidential election in 2ooo, Dominators are prevailing, acting with unilateral and military actions, sloughing off the treaties restraining military flexibility. Criticized by Conciliators, Dominators are changing to form a coalition to prevent the isolation from the Allies, which was caused by putting too much value on the missile defense. As mentioned above, the deterrence concept was crucial in its relations with China and Russia particularly in the pursuit of non proliferation. Krepon claimed that China, Russia, take into account the deterrence as a capability to give minimal destruction to US in the days of US superiority in nuclear, conventional forces including missile defense (2003: 187-189). It is highly possible to presume that North Korea would come up to negotiation table, with in a year, when they think they secured the deterrence, or when they are ready to talk with strong hand to US by assuring their strong strategic position with their Hwasong-14, or Pukkuksong 1, 2 missiles. It would be a good guide to assess the recent North Korean missile tests and their future direction of missile development. It is notable that recently the President of Council on Foreign Relations, Richard Hass, proposed, after considering three alternatives, first, reluctant acceptance of North Korea as nuclear state, second, use of military attacks, third, multilateral negotiations, like six-party talks, to try diplomacy first on North Korea (Haass, 2017). It is important to note that Haas, presumed to belong to Dominators, has proposed “diplomacy”, which is the essential instrument of conciliators. It is also remarkable that Choe Son-hui, director-general of the North America affairs of North Korean Foreign Ministry, told reporters in at the Beijing Capital International Airport in May 2017, that North Korea would hold dialogue under right conditions with the new US administration (Stanglin, 2017).
IV.        Concluding Remarks
It was actually Kim Jung-il who concluded the Agreed Framework with the US on October 21, 1994, after Kim Il-sung’s death on July 8, 1994. It may be said that Kim Jung-un just followed the will of Kim Jung-il in his pursuit of nuclear weapons, and then it would be better to remember that it was also Kim Jung-il who wanted to normalize diplomatic relations with the US by dispatching General Cho Myung-rok as his personal special envoy to meet President Clinton on October 10, 2000. Recently, a South Korean expert on the North Korean nuclear problem revealed that North Korea is presumed to have 45 nuclear weapons and also the nuclear materials of 52kg of plutonium and 280kg of HEU (Sooyeon, 2017). In addition, in October 2008, the ROK Defense Ministry estimated that North Korea might have between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons of chemical weapons with 150 warheads for ballistic missiles (Bermudez, 2013).
While celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Nunn-Lugar CTR program on May 9, 2016, Carter praised the forward-looking statement that helped make the historic change. As he said, it was brand-new thought which might be paradoxical to some, and it was controversial, but the two senators, irrespective of their political parties, made a global breakthrough in the nuclear weapons field. It is only the USA that has expertise and funding for a CTR program and the only success history of denuclearization. In their testimony to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on January 31, 2017, Nicholas Eberstadt emphasized working with allies, but acting unilaterally, at the same time, arguing that the US can bluff then mitigate, and eventually eliminate the WMDs of North Korea by Threat Reduction (Eberstadt, 2017). With emphasis on US-ROK close coordination, as a way of dealing with the North Korean threat, Scott Snyder has very recently recommended dispatching a special envoy and separating the North Korean problem from other contentious issues in US-China relations, though not apparently mentioning the CTR program (Snyder, 2017). With the comprehensive approach to North Korea’s nuclear problem including the CTR program, the US and the ROK should jointly organize the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and consequently peace as well as stability in north-east Asia. As explained by Senator Lugar after 20 years, “No one would have predicted in the 1980s that Americans and Russians would be working together to destroy weapons in the former Soviet Union, and the Nunn-Lugar Program can be applied around the world” (NTI, November 30, 2012). Keeping the significance of the Nunn-Lugar’s CTR program and the close US-ROK cooperation in mind, it would be a good concluding remark to reiterate what the designated US Secretary of Defense said in his Senate confirmation hearings, on 12 January 2017, that his primary mission at the Pentagon would be allowing the State Department to negotiate from a “position of strength” to avoid conflict in an era of rapidly evolving world wide threats to work with and strengthen our alliances (Steele, 2017). It is irony to see the South Korea’s Central Bank’s revelation that North Korea’s economy grew 3.9percent in 2016, its fastest pace in 17 years. Despite of international sanctions due to the nuclear development program since 2006 and food shortages, overall exports from North Korea also rose to $2.82 billion thanks to the fishery products (Reuters, July 20, 2017).





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